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Colonialism versus Nationalism: 
The Plague of Hong Kong in 1894
Drawing upon different source materials, this paper examines the significance of 
the plague of Hong Kong in 1894 in two ways. Firstly, it shows the process by 
which the colonial power successfully implemented the public health policy in 
Hong Kong by collaborating with the local Chinese communities. Secondly, it 
demonstrates how the Chinese in Hong Kong responded to the colonial mandatory 
measures by resisting them or partially accepting them. This paper highlights the 
reactions of the Chinese towards the prevention measures implemented by the 
British, and the controversy about the effectiveness of Chinese and western 
medicine in safeguarding public health. 
 
Keywords: Hong Kong plague, colonialism, Aoyama-Kitasato-Yersin controversy, 
Tung Wah Hospital, Chinese and Western medicine
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I. Colonialism, Medicine, Public Health, 
    and the Modern State  
  
The plague of Hong Kong in 1894 was not only significant in the 
history of Hong Kong but also in the history of Asia. Firstly, the plague 
bacillus that was identified had been mysterious for centuries. The plague 
in Hong Kong was instrumental in discovering the bacillus and hence 
laying the foundation for finding an effective cure. Secondly, after the 
plague started in the Guangxi and Yunnan province of China, infection 
reached in 1894 Hong Kong, Macau in 1895, Taiwan in 1896, India in 
1896-98, San Francisco in 1899, and Australia in 1900-03. As a 
consequence, a total of 22 million people died by this single disease. 
Since Asia was ruled during that time by different colonial powers 
including Britain, France, Japan, and the Netherlands, the plague in Hong 
Kong was never treated as an isolated case. Instead, it was closely 
monitored by the British government in London to show how its colonial 
power implemented a public health policy in the European model and 
how the indigenous Chinese responded to the mandatory measures.
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The history of public health is not a new subject, but among 
Chinese scholars it is still an unexplored area. In Hong Kong, the 
research of medical history in general and public health history in 
particular, are both undeveloped. Current publications on public health 
focus on personal biographies of the medical profession, and the history 
of hospitals as medical organizations.1 With respect to the studies of 
plague, since 1975 E. J. Proyor, Molly Sutphen, Carney Fisher, and 
Robert Peckham have published books and articles that examine the 
origins of plague, its diffusion, its social and political consequences of 
amelioration, and its impact on public health in Hong Kong.2 Recently, 
two doctoral theses dealt with the position of the Tung Wah Hospital 
during and after the plague.3 Yet, compared with English language 
An early version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on “Ideas, 
Organization, and Practice of Hygiene in Han Society from the Traditional to the Modern Periods,” 
held at the Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, in 2004. 
The author wishes to thank Charlotte Furth and Hon Tze-li for their comments, and Iijima Wataru, 
Li Shang-Jen, Li Yushang and Ng Kwok-leung for their assistance in collecting materials.
1¡ Current available publications have focused on individuals and organizations, such as biographies 
or memoirs of James Cantlie (1939, 1983), Ho Kai (1980, 2000), Li Shu-fan (1964), Li Shu-
pui (1996), and Li Song (1987), Harry Fang (2002); the hospital anniversary book of Tung Wah 
Hospitals (1961, 1970, 1998, 2000, 2010), Drs. Anderson and Partners (1984), Alice Ho Miu 
Ling Nethersole Hospital (1957, 1967, 1987), Maltilda (1988), Tsan Yuk (1992), Prince of Wales 
Hospital (1995), Kowloon Hospital (1995), Queen Mary Hospital (1997), Kowloon Hospital 
(1997), Sanatorium (1997); Hong Kong College of Medicine, Hong Kong University and 
Medicine Faculty (1987), Hong Kong Tuberculosis, Chest & Heart Diseases Association (1994), 
Hong Kong College of Radiologists (1995), Chinese University of Hong Kong Medicine Faculty 
(1995), Hong Kong Neurosurgical Society (1999), Red Cross (2000). For details, see Lee Pui-tak, 
An Annotated Bibliography of Hong Kong History (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2001), 105-108.
2¡ See Molly Sutphen, Cookie-cutter Epidemics? The Colonial Office and the Plague Epidemics 
in Cape Town and Hong Kong, 1901-1902 (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
University of London, 1992); Carney Fisher, “Plague in Hong Kong 1894” (paper presented at the 
International Conference on Hong Kong and Modern China, University of Hong Kong, December 
3-5, 1997); Robert John Collins, “The black death: Hong Kong 1894” (lecture, Hong Kong 
Museum of Medical Sciences, April 24, 1999); Robert Peckham, “Infective economies: empire, 
panic and the business of disease,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 41, no. 2 
(2013), 211-237.
3¡ Hong Zhou, “The Origins of Government Social Protection Policy in Hong Kong, 1842-1941” 
(PhD thesis, Brandeis University, 1992); Yang Xiangyin, “Colonial Power and Medical Space: 
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publications, writings on Hong Kong medical history are relatively small 
in quantity, and they are mainly empirical reports of facts. Most of these 
writings are personal recollections, which mainly provide empirical data.
In contrast, more attention has been paid to public health among 
Western scholars. Comparable research on China and India by Kerrie 
MacPherson, Carol Benedict, Iijima Wataru, David Arnold, I. J. 
Catanach, and Rajnarayan Chandavarkar show how the British colonial 
public health policies formed before and after the plague and how the 
indigenous Chinese and Indians reacted from resistance to partial 
acceptance to these policies.4
This article examines the plague of Hong Kong in 1894 from 
political and social perspectives. Drawing upon different sources 
materials, it discusses the cause and discovery of the bacillus, the 
reactions of the Chinese towards the preventive measures implemented 
by the British, and the debates between Chinese and western doctors 
about the plague. This paper will also touch upon the different 
conceptions of health, disease, hygiene, and living environment in the 
British colony. In the final section, it will address how colonialism 
conflicted with nationalism in the debate about public health.
The Transformation of Chinese and Western Medical Services in the Tung Wah Group of 
Hospitals, 1894-1941” (PhD thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007).
4¡ See Kerrie L. MacPherson, A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 
1843-1893 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987); I. J. Cantanach, “Plague and the 
Tensions of Empire: India 1896-1919,” in Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed., David 
Arnold (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 149-171; David Arnold, Colonizing 
the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-century India (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993); Carol Benedict, Bubonic Plague in Nineteenth-Century 
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, Imperial Power 
and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India, c.1850-1950 (Cambridge & New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Arnold, Science, Technology, and Medicine 
in Colonial India (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Iijima Wataru, 
Pesuto to kindai Chūgoku: eisei no seidoka to shakai henyō [Plague and modern China: The 
institutionalization of public health and social change] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 2000).
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II. The Spread of Plague from China to Hong Kong
Hong Kong became a free port in the 1840s. In the following decades, 
with the improvement of harbor facilities and the growth of ship building 
industry, Hong Kong was transformed from a desolate island into one of 
the most important trading ports on China’s coast. Furthermore, Hong 
Kong’s proximity to China gave her an advantage in access to the 
hinterland. As has been noted in a recent study of Hong Kong economic 
history, 
Hong Kong was entrepôt port for South China and Southeast Asia, 
and substantial amounts of its trade were made up of foodstuffs (rice, 
wheat flour), raw material (cotton, sugar) and fuel (kerosene and coal). 
… The commodities of greatest predominance in weight are rice, coal 
and raw sugar imported from French Indo-China, Siam, Japan, Korea 
and Formosa (Taiwan) and Netherland East Indies (Indonesia); except 
for raw sugar which is refined in Hong Kong and exported principally 
to North China, of the other two commodities, rice is almost wholly 
exported to South China and coal partly to South China but delivered 
mostly to steamers. It should be clear that from this description that 
Hong Kong’s trade was tied very closely to economic development in 
South China.5
From Table 1 may be seen that the transport between Hong Kong and 
neighboring Chinese ports were frequent and rapid. Chinese passengers 
or traders carried provisions from China such as fresh vegetables, fruits, 
poultry, eggs, and other daily consumables for which Hong Kong was 
dependent on China. Nevertheless, the import and export of Chinese 
5¡ David Faure and Lee Pui-tak, eds., A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Economy (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 2.
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products was the major component of Hong Kong’s entrepôt trade. In 
1868, the guild of import and export firms called “North-South guild” (南
Table 1. Chinese Ports Linked to Hong Kong by Junk in 1866
Name of  
Chinese port
Number of 
junks engaged
Number of trips 
each per month
Duration of stay in 
Hong Kong
Canton
Macao
Kong-moon
Chun Chun
Toong-koon
Sheak-loong
Tai-ping
Namtao
Heong-shan
Sun-chun
Kowloong City
Sei-heong
Tsung Sheang
Wong-kong
Koo Soo
Chaong-sha
Tik-hoi
Tseen-wan
Tai-pang City
Sha-yu-Chong
Chaong Chow
Peng-chow
Tai O
Mow-chow
Kew-tow
Eem-teen
Tam-shui
28
17
9
8
7
6
5
5
5
5
4
5
2
1
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
2
3
8
3
3
4
3
6
10
3
10
Daily
10
3
15
15
3
3
Daily
10
Daily
15
Daily
Daily
10
10
6
6
From 6 to 24 hours
From 6 to 24 hours
From 6 to 24 hours
From 6 to 24 hours
From 6 to 24 hours
From 6 to 24 hours
From 6 to 24 hours
From 2 to 12 hours
From 6 to 24 hours
From 2 to 12 hours
Immediate departure
From 2 to 12 hours
From 6 to 24 hours
From 5 to 12 hours
From 5 to 12 hours
Uncertain
Uncertain
Immediate departure
From 2 to 12 hours
Immediate departure
From 5 to 12 hours
Immediate departure
Immediate departure
From 2 to 12 hours
From 2 to 12 hours
From 2 to 12 hours
From 2 to 12 hours
Source: “Petition from Chinese merchants, traders and lessees of land, residing in the 
Colony,” Hong Kong Government Gazette, 17 November 1866, cited in David Faure and Lee 
Pui-tak, eds., A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Economy (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2004), 11.
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北行),6 was established in Bonham Strand. The guild was not only a 
business association, but also a mainstay of the first Chinese public 
organization known as the Tung Wah Hospital (東華醫院).
It is worth to ask where the plague of Hong Kong came from. Due 
to proximity and constant trade, Hong Kong imported plague from 
Guangdong province, the so-called economic hinterland of Hong Kong. 
More significantly, the plague came by sea rather than over land. 
Frequent contacts in the border area had not been happened than in the 
sea transportation. When the plague started in 1894, Hong Kong’s border 
with China was in Kowloon. It was not until 1898, the Kowloon 
Peninsula was annexed with Hong Kong. In 1871, Beihai was infected, 
and then followed by Lianzhou, Qingzhou, Leizhou Peninsula, and 
Hainan Island. It has been pointed out that plague spread to towns and 
cities more easily than to villages, and to coastal areas more easily than 
to interior areas. From 1890 onwards, as China lost the control of ship 
quarantine, the plague spread quickly through the opened ports of 
Guangdong, starting from Beihai to Guangzhou, Shantou, Hong Kong, 
and nineteen more other cities in Guangdong Province.7 The frequent 
trading activities among these different cities had been provided as a 
major channel for the circulation of the disease.
Management of maritime customs constituted an important factor 
causing the outbreak of plague in China. According to Lin Xinhao, 
quarantine in Chinese port cities started in Shanghai and Xiamen as early 
as 1873.8 But the Chinese authority introduced quarantine measures to 
other Chinese ports slowly. Gradually, after Shanghai and Xiamen, 
6¡ As the name denotes, these firms dealt in the business of transporting products between south and 
north China.
7¡ Zhongguo shuyi liuxingshi [The history of the spread of plague in China] (Beijing: Chinese 
Academy of Medical Sciences, 1982), 1459-1460.
8¡ Lin Xinhao, “Jindai haigang jianyi yu Dongnanya huajiao yimin” [Harbor quarantine and 
migration of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia], Haijiaoshi yanjiu, no. 2 (1998). 
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quarantine measures were introduced to other Chinese cities: Beihai in 
1877, Shantou in 1883, Ningbo in 1894, Tianjin in 1895, Liuzhuan in 
1899, Fuzhou in 1900, Hankou in 1902, Guangzhou in 1911, and Yantai 
in 1912. And in 1930 the National Office of Harbor Quarantine (全國海港
檢疫處) was established in Shanghai, and subsequently the quarantine 
service finally became systematized throughout the country.9 As Robert 
John Collins points out, 
This third and last great plague pandemic spread to Hong Kong from an 
endemic focus in Yunnan province of south China in 1893. Transported 
along caravan and river routes it reached Canton and Hong Kong in 
1894 and Singapore and Bombay by 1896. The spread of epidemic was 
closely related to land-, river- and sea-borne trade and it is possible 
to trace its movement from South Asia via the major trading routes 
to India, the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines and from there, further 
afield.10
Because Hong Kong had close economic ties with China, she was quickly 
affected by the plague. On May 10, 1894, Governor William Robinson 
declared Hong Kong as an infected port and started quarantining infected 
visitors. As a result, the trade between China and Hong Kong was 
decimated. As plague came through the trading routes, the increase in the 
speed of transport heightened the threat of the epidemic. Ironically, the 
movement of goods and people that colonialism fostered helped to 
spread the deadly plague.11
9¡ Yang Shangci, “120 nianlai Zhongguo weisheng jianyi” [Health quarantine in China of the last 
120 years], Zhonghua yishi zhazhi 25, no. 2 (1995), 78.
10¡ Robert John Collins, “The black death: Hong Kong 1894” (lecture, Hong Kong Museum of 
Medical Sciences, April 24, 1999).
11¡ See Myron Echenberg, Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague, 1894-1901 
(New York: New York University Press, 2007).
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III. The Aoyama-Kitasato-Yersin Controversy
1. Why did Japan Have to Study the Hong Kong Plague?
From 1868, Japan restructured its political and social orders. As part of 
the country’s modernization, Japan was active in promoting Asian 
participation in international medical associations. For instance, the 
country vied with France in public health issues, indicating its 
determination to compete with European counterparts in international 
affairs.
When Hong Kong reported 130 cases of plague on May 15, 1894, 
the Foreign Office in London urged the Hong Kong government to take 
immediate action to investigate the matter and to ask for international 
assistance to solve the problem. At that time, plague was a mysterious 
disease to both Western and Chinese medicine, which offered generally 
ineffective treatments. During the 1880s and 1890s, with rapid progress 
in microbiology in Europe, scientists were refining molecular techniques 
to uncover the cause of plague. Louis Pasteur in France and Robert Koch 
in Germany, for example, were the two famous specialists in the field.12 
Because of the 1894 plague, Hong Kong quickly became the global site 
for conducting research on the disease’s outbreak.13 Two groups of 
scientists, one from Japan headed by Aoyama Tanemichi (青山胤通, 
1859-1917) and Kitasato Shibasaburō (北里柴三郎, 1852-1931), and the 
other from France headed by Alexandre Yersin (1863-1943), who came 
from French Indo-China, arrived in Hong Kong at the request of the 
12¡ That period is called the golden age of microbiology as the germ theory tells many diseases are 
caused by specific bacteria. Say for example, gonorrhea, typhoid, tuberculosis, and pneumonia 
are caused by different bacteria. See the pamphlet wrote by Tom Solomon, “The Hong Kong 
plague of 1894 and the discovery of the cause of plague,” Hong Kong Museum of Medical 
Sciences.
13¡ Collins, “The black death: Hong Kong 1894.”
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Hong Kong government.
Of the two international teams, the Japanese attracted special 
attention because their country was going to have war with China over 
Korea in August 1894. Several reasons may explain the Japanese 
government’s decision to take such an unusual action. First, due to 
location Japan had concern about the spread of plague in East Asia.14 
Second, the Japanese scientists were invited by the Hong Kong 
government after the Foreign Office in London advised Hong Kong to do 
so soon after the outbreak. And third, the international competition of 
medical science forced the Japanese to be proactive in reaching the site 
of the plague as fast as possible.15
2. The Rivalry between Aoyama Tanemichi and Kitasato 
    Shibasaburō
The controversy among the three international scientists was 
complicated. The controversy began with Aoyama and Kitasato. The two 
Japanese experts were both graduated from the Tokyo Medical 
University (which later merged with the Medical School of Tokyo 
University). After that they went to Berlin University for further study 
supervised by Dr. Robert Koch. After they came back to Japan in the late 
14¡ It was known that the Japanese consul in Hong Kong Nakagawa Kōjirō reported to the Foreign 
Ministry the plague attack in Hong Kong on May 12, 1894. See Okuda Otojirō, Meiji shonen ni 
okeru Honkon Nihonjin [The Japanese in Hong Kong during the early years of the Meiji period] 
(Taihoku: Taiwan sōtukufu nettai sangyō chōsakai, 1937), 322.
15¡ Otani Tadashi gave a detailed account of the international communications including steamship 
navigation, cable telegraph, and postal service of Japan during the late nineteenth century, were 
placed under the control of Great Britain, see his Kindai Nihon no taigai senden [The foreign 
propaganda of modern Japan] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1994), 14-22. It is logical for Japan 
to send the research team to Hong Kong to cultivate friendship with Britain. Regarding the 
diplomatic relations of Japan with Britain, in particular, the Anglo-Japan Alliance in 1902, there 
is a large literature on the topic. Besides, the Governor of Hong Kong Sir William Robinson 
was on a visit in Japan, and he returned immediately to Hong Kong on May 15, 1894, after the 
outbreak of plague.
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1880s, they had different career paths. Aoyama was soon placed as a 
professor in Tokyo University (Tōdai 東大) while Kitasato was excluded, 
which made him critical of the Tōdai clique. The situation became worse 
when Kitasato criticized another renowned Tokyo University 
microbiologist, Ogata Masanori (緒方正規), on the discovery of the 
beriberi bacillus, dealing a blow to the Tōdai clique.16 In 1892, with the 
support of senior politician Fukuzawa Yukichi (福澤諭吉), Kitasato 
established the Institute of Infectious Diseases (傳染病研究所) and later 
in 1917 the Medical School of Keio University. Thus, before the two 
men set sail from Yokohama to Hong Kong they were already rivals.
Table 2. Comparison among Kitasao, Aoyama, and Yersin
Kitasato Shibasaburō 
(1852-1931)
Aoyama Tanemichi 
(1859-1917)
Alexandre Yersin 
(1863-1943)
Birth place Kumamoto Tokyo Aubonne, Switzerland
Home 
country 
education
Furushiro Medical 
School, 1871; 
Tokyo University, 
1875-1883
Tokyo University,
1877-1882
Bachelor of Arts, 1882
Overseas 
education
(supervision)
Berlin University, 
1886-1892
 (Robert Koch)
Berlin University, 
1883 (Robert Koch); 
Paris University, 1887
Hôtel-dieu Hospital Paris 
1882-1887 (Louis Pasteur); 
École Normal Supérieur 
(Emil Roux); Berlin 
University (Robert Koch, 
Richard Petri, 
Carl Fränkel), 1888
Specialty Microbiology Anatomy, 
internal medicine
Pathology,
infectious diseases
Stay in 
Hong Kong
June 12-July 19, 1894 June 12-August 21, 
1894
June 15-July 31, 1894
16¡ Sakai Shitsu, “Kaisetsu,” in Uzaki Kumakichi, Aoyama Tanemichi (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1930, 
1998 reprint), 2.
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Career Sanitary Bureau of 
Interior Department, 
1883; founded the 
Institute of  Infectious 
Disease, 1892; founded 
Kitasato Institute, 1914; 
founded the Medical 
School of Keio 
University, 1917; 
President of Japan 
Physicians, 1923
Professor, Medical 
School of Tokyo 
University,* 1887; 
President, 1901; 
Director of University 
Hospital, 1892; 
Adjunct Director 
of the Institute of 
Infectious Disease, 
1915
Ship physicians in Indo-
China; Colonial Health 
Corps; Pasteur Institute 
in Saigon, 1891; founded 
Pasteur Institute in 
Nhatrang, 1895; founded 
Hanoi’s Medical School
Honors Member of the House 
of Peers, 1917; 
Baron, 1924
4th class medal, 1894; 
3rd class medal, 1900; 
Gakushin Fellow, 
1906; Baron, 1917
Nominated for Honorary 
Director of Pasteur Institute 
and a member of its Board 
of Administration in 1934. 
A private university 
founded in Da Lat 
(Vietnam) in 2004 was 
named as Yersin University
Political 
patron
Fukuzawa Yukichi Ōkuma Shigenobu
大隈重信
Nil
*Tokyo University was formed in 1877 with the merger of the Tokyo Medical School and 
Tokyo Kaisei School.
Sources: Uzaki Kumakichi, Aoyama Tanemichi (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1998); Nagaki Daizō, 
Kitasato Shibasaburō to sono ichmon (Tokyo: Keiō gijiku daigaku shuppankai, 2001); David 
J. Bibel and T.H. Chen. “Diagnosis of Plague: An Analysis of the Yersin-Kitasato Controversy,” 
Bacteriological Review 40, no. 3 (September 1976), 633-51.
Kitasato and Aoyama arrived in Hong Kong on June 12 and they started 
working on June 14. However, two weeks later Aoyama became infected 
after he dissected victims’ bodies. Therefore, he was not able to compete 
with Kitasato. Sakai Shitsu, the writer of Aoyama’s biography, argued 
that his contribution to the study of the Hong Kong plague has been 
overlooked for two reasons: first, Aoyama had an unexpected infection 
that prevented him from completing his research; second, the rivalry 
between Tōdai and the Institute of Infectious Disease led to unfair 
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treatment of Aoyama.17
How did Aoyama view his rival Kitasato? In the investigation 
report that Aoyama wrote and submitted to Japan’s Ministry of Internal 
Affairs in Tokyo in November 1894, he rarely mentioned Kitasato or any 
other parties who had cooperated with him, but he did state in the report 
that a microbiological survey would be submitted separately by Kitasato. 
He also noted in the report that communication with the patients was 
extremely difficult because he could not speak either Cantonese or 
English.18 However, in another report, “Über die Pestepidemie in Hong-
kong in Jahre 1894” which was written in German in 1895, Aoyama 
criticized Kitasato, who had mistakenly identified the round shaped 
bacillus.19
Despite the controversy, it is clear that Aoyama did several 
autopsies on the victims of different races, while Kitasato found 
numerous bacilli in the blood from the heart and in organs of victims. On 
July 10, 1894, Kitasato made a presentation at the Government Civil 
Hospital in Hong Kong. The result of his investigation was reported by a 
local newspaper, the Daily Press, on July 12. On August 25, 1894, his 
article “The bacillus of bubonic plague” was published in the 
authoritative medical journal The Lancet. Because of the publicity, 
Kitasato made the claim that he was the first person to discover the 
plague bacillus.
17¡ Sakai Shitsu, “Kaisetsu,” 2-3.
18¡ See Aoyama Tanemichi, “Honkon hyakushito ryakuhō” [Report on miscellaneous of Hong 
Kong], dated November 12, 1894, 4, 42; and Uzaki, Aoyama Tanemichi, 68.
19¡ Tsuneseki Keiichi, “Densenbyō kenkyūjo ikan jiken: Kitasato Shibasaburō” [The transfer of the 
Institute of Infectious Diseases: Kitasato Shibasaburō], in Sukyandaru kagakushi [Scandals in 
scientific history], ed. Kagaku Asahi (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1989), 112. It is worth noting 
that the controversy between Aoyama and Kitasato extended to the plague discovered in Taiwan 
in 1897; see Nagaki Daizō, Kitasato Shibasaburō to sono ichimon (Tokyo: Keiō gijiku daigaku 
shuppankai, 2001), 28-29.
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3. The Rivalry between Kitasato and Yersin
With the help of British authorities, Kitasato was able to set up a 
laboratory in the Kennedy Town Hospital, where the victims were 
treated. He had all the necessary facilities for the autopsy provided by the 
Acting Superintendent of the Government Civil Hospital, James A. 
Lowson. By contrast, Yersin arrived in Hong Kong on June 15, 1894, 
three days after Kitasato. He was not given any support and had to build 
a straw hut near the Alice Hospital to conduct research. To make matters 
worse, he was refused access to the bodies of plague victims. However, 
with the help of an Italian missionary who was acting as his interpreter, 
he bribed English sailors who were carrying away the dead. With their 
help, he was able to examine the buboes for the bacillus. Following his 
complaint to the local authority, he was later allowed access to victims’ 
bodies. After careful autopsy, he found a bacillus similar to Kitasato’s 
from the dead victims.20 It is interesting to ask why Yersin did not receive 
a warm welcome from the local government as Kitasato and Aoyama did. 
It can be assumed that the British in Hong Kong did not feel comfortable 
towards the French expansion in Asia, for they were suspicious to extend 
their influences in the region. On the other hand, Yersin was depressed 
by his research project in Indo-China, which had been turned down by 
the governor. It would seem psychologically logical for Yersin to regain 
his confidence and prove that he was a competent scientist.21
As can be seen from tables two and three, Kitasato received his 
training from Koch in Germany while Yersin did his study at the Pasteur 
Institute in Paris, indicating that they came from different academic 
backgrounds. As quoted from Tom Solomon, Yersin’s careful identification 
of the plague bacillus had been recognized.
20¡ Collins, “The black death: Hong Kong 1894.”
21¡ David J. Bibel and T.H. Chen, “Diagnosis of Plague: An Analysis of the Yersin-Kitasato 
Controversy,” Bacteriological Review 40, no. 3 (September 1976), 636.
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… Over the years there has been much debate as to who deserves the 
credit for identifying the plague bacillus. Although Kitasato’s discovery 
was a few days before Yersin’s and was published first in the medical 
literature, his description lacked his usual precision. Yersin’s accurate 
description and culture of the plague bacillus has been acknowledged in 
the taxonomic naming of the bacillus – Yersinia pestis.22
Why did Kitasato commit such an error in the description of the 
bacterium? David J. Bibel and T.H. Chen suggest that several reasons be 
taken into account. First, language may have significantly contributed to 
the personal rivalry as Kitasato’s report was probably translated from 
either German or Japanese. If it was originally written in Japanese, the 
imprecise language in the report may have been a result of bad 
translation. Second, after his report released in August 1894 was severely 
criticized, Kitasato may have lost confidence for not knowing which 
characteristic was due to the pneumococcus, yet to deny the data would 
mean to discontinue the investigation. What do we learn from these 
Aoyama-Kitasato and Kitasato-Yersin rivalries? Bibel and Chen 
conclude that the plague studies conducted by Kitasato and Yersin were 
as controversial as the nature of the plague bacillus itself. They find that 
Kitasato’s description of the bacterium in 1894 was basically correct. 
They write, “It is only because of the similarity of the plague bacillus to 
the pneumococcus under specific but common conditions that Kitasato 
was led to subsequent error and doubt.”23 
As put by a local scholar of Hong Kong society, “It was Kitasato 
who laid first claim to having identified the plague bacterium, but the 
22¡ Tom Solomon, “The Hong Kong plague of 1894 and the discovery of the cause of plague.”
23¡ Bibel and Chen, “Diagnosis of Plague: An Analysis of the Yersin-Kitasato Controversy,” 636-
638; 647-648. Bibel and Chen offer a splendid explanation as to why the controversy happened 
by comparing the findings of Kitasato and Yersin, which gives a technical perspective. For 
details, please see their article.
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final honours went to Yersin and for whom the bacterium is named.”24 In 
nineteenth-century Hong Kong, as with other places, science was part of 
international and local politics. Yersin was mistreated by the British 
colonial government. But surprisingly to many of the colonists, it was he 
who earned the reputation of discovering the plague bacillus. Obviously, 
Kitasato had been slighted due to his race though he was the first to 
announce the result of his plague investigation.
IV. The Conflicts between Western and Chinese 
      Medicine in Hong Kong
1. Resistance and Confrontation
On May 22, 1894, 393 cases of plague were recorded and 320 people 
had died in Hong Kong. By the end of 1894 the plague had claimed over 
2,500 victims, and about 80,000 Chinese had left the colony. Vessels 
from Hong Kong were quarantined by most countries, resulting in the 
loss of trade. On the whole, Hong Kong suffered greatly from the 
plague. When the dust settled, the general opinion of the time was that 
the plague was mainly caused by the poor living conditions of Chinese. 
According to Table 3, the mortality rate of Chinese was 70-90 percent, 
the second highest as compared with the Indians, Portuguese, Eurasians, 
and British.
24¡ Veronica Pearson, “A plague upon our houses: The consequences of underfunding on the health 
sector,” in A Sense of Place: Hong Kong West of Pottinger Street, eds. Veronica Pearson and Ko 
Tim-keung (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 2008), 259.
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Table 3. Death Rate of Plague in Hong Kong in 1894
Race British Eurasian Japanese Indian Portuguese 
and Malay
Chinese who 
stayed in 
Kennedy 
Town 
Hospital
Chinese who 
stayed in 
Tung Wah 
Hospital
Death 
rate
1.66% 100.0% 54.5% 66.6% 60.0% 70% 80-90%
Source: Aoyama Tanemichi, Honkon hyakushito ryakuhō 香港百志土略報 [Report on the 
miscellaneous of Hong Kong] (Tokyo,  November 12, 1894), 44.
Due to the fact that plague was particularly prevalent in the Chinese 
residential areas, measures of immediate quarantine were taken. As a 
result, conflicts between the Chinese communities and the colonial 
government occurred. Firstly, the victims being treated in the Tung Wah 
Hospital were not willing to be moved to the Hygeia hospital ship. 
Secondly, a house-to-house search of victims was implemented by the 
military. Consequently, the searches met with strong resistance from 
local residents. Thirdly, there was deep Chinese prejudice against 
western medicine, and Chinese returned to Canton to look for chances of 
healing.25 Chinese left Hong Kong because they had learned of rumors of 
the ill-treatment of dead bodies. As for why many Hong Kong Chinese 
left the city, this was mainly due to rumors. There was speculation that 
once the victims’ bodies were sent to the government hospital or the 
Hygeia, they would be shipped off to Europe for making medicine for 
royal families. Speculation even circulated that eyebrows and livers 
would be taken from Chinese children for use in the treatment of 
plague.26
25¡ J. Dyer-Ball, “A Chinese view of the plague,” Hong Kong Government Gazette (1895), 423-425. 
See also Elizabeth Sinn, Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital, Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), 159-183, who provides a full account of the 
early development of the plague.
26¡ Correspondence from Robinson to Lord Ripon, dated 23 May 1894, CO 129/263/122. See Hong 
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On May 23, 1894, 300 volunteers of the Shropshire Light Infantry 
began the task of inspecting and disinfecting the houses in the Tai Ping 
Shan (太平山).27 However, unrest occurred because of the uninvited entry 
into the local inhabitants’ houses as well as the forcible removal of 
patients. This led the government to position the gunboat Tweed off the 
coast of Tai Ping Shan with its guns pointed at the area of the shore. With 
up to 100 people dying each day, a mass exodus of Chinese to China 
continued as they felt that if they were to die they would like to be buried 
in their home village. Panic later spread among the Westerners when one 
of the officers of the Shropshire Light Infantry, Captain Vesey, contracted 
plague and died. On May 31, the Sanitary Board drew up more by-laws 
which allowed for the eviction of occupants and the closure of buildings 
judged unfit for habitation.28 Chinese houses built in Kau Yu Fong (九如
坊), Sin Hing Lee (善慶里), Nga Choi Hong (芽菜巷), Mei Lun Lee (美侖
里) were demolished and a brick wall was built to surround these areas. 
The Colonial Office in London urged the Hong Kong government to 
close down the Tung Wah Hospital.29 In 1896, the Sanitary Board 
received criticism for being ineffective in managing the plague. Worse 
still, people in the Legislative Council suggested it be abolished.
2. The Tearing Down of Tai Ping Shan Quarters
The sanitary conditions of Chinese in Hong Kong had been a great 
concern within the government.30 The Chadwick Report of 1882, was 
Zhou, The Origins of Government Social Protection Policy in Hong Kong, 1842-1941, 137.
27¡ Jerome J. Platt, Maurice E. Jones, and Arleen Kay Platt, eds., The White Wash Brigade (London: 
Dix Noonan Webb, 1998).
28¡ Collins, “The black death: Hong Kong 1894.”
29¡ G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987), 220.
30¡ Y. W. Lau, A History of the Municipal Councils of Hong Kong, 1883-1999 (Hong Kong: Leisure 
and Cultural Services Department, 2002), 37-39.
116 
fully illustrative about the living conditions of the Chinese in the British 
colony. They were accused of sanitary nuisances. This report was 
regarded as significant in early Hong Kong’s public health history for it 
described subjects such as house construction and drainage, the 
formation of streets, public sewers or drains, water supply, scavenging, 
and the removal of night soil. Osbert Chadwick had been appointed by 
the Colonial Office as a possible solution to a long-standing dispute 
between Governor of Hong Kong Sir John Pope Hennessy (Governor, 
1877-1882) and his civil servants, notably the Colonial Surgeon and the 
Surveyor General. The issues that the Chadwick Report addressed were 
sores in the dispute, and they arose from precisely the questions of 
ventilation for congested houses, drains, sewage, and the disposal of 
human waste, and the appropriateness of water closets for the Hong 
Kong environment figuring prominently.31 In the following paragraphs, I 
quote from David Faure on the interpretation of the Chadwick Report.
The houses were not congested by the standards Hong Kong became 
used to. In four houses Chadwick went into in Taipingshan Street, he 
counted about 10 to 11 people in each basement that was occupied, and 
between 14 and 20 people on the second floor. Where the ground floor 
was not used as a shop, it housed up to 30 people. Chadwick calculated 
how much space each person occupied in cubic measures, and he found 
that in these four houses, each person might have been given 300 to 
400 cu. feet. If we assume that the ceiling was 10 feet, and a substantial 
amount of space must be subtracted from the overall average to make 
up the corridors and the kitchens, the bedrooms occupied by these 
inhabitants would have conformed to his description. “In the house in 
31¡ See “Mr Chadwick’s Report on the Sanitary Condition of Hong Kong” (November 1882), 
Colonial Office, Eastern No. 38, CO 882/4, Public Record Office, London. An extract of this 
report may be found in David Faure, ed., A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Society (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), 29-48.
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Kai-ming Lane, like the great majority of dwelling-houses, the upper 
floor is divided off by board partitions into cabins about 9 feet long and 
10 feet wide. Each of these forms the dwelling of an individual family. 
 
Chadwick notes that the population of 106,000 of urban Hong 
Kong (including non-Chinese people) in 1881 occupied 6,402 houses, 
averaging 16.6 persons per house. It would seem that the Tai Ping Shan 
houses represented the extreme of congestion rather than the norm. 
… Chadwick went into the state of the sewers and the drains in great 
detail. He insisted on standards and supervision. He commented on the 
state of the latrines, his precise descriptions bringing home with stark 
realism the bare necessities of life: As a general rule throughout Hong 
Kong, in accordance with time-honoured Chinese practice, human 
excreta are removed by hand, on what may be called the "pail" system. 
Neither deodorisation or disinfection of any kind is attempted. … In 
many European houses waterclosets are used in connexion with the 
town drains, but they are for the use of Europeans only; the method 
just mentioned being used for the native servants. … As in the Chinese 
cities of the mainland, the men of the working classes resort to public 
latrines. … There are 25 public latrines in the city of Victoria, having 
in all 565 seats, the number in each varying from 2 to 51. These latrines 
are built and owned by private persons as a business speculation. Their 
construction and management is supervised by Government, who levy 
a tax of $0.60 per seat per annum. The latrine owner derives his profit 
(said to be very large) from the sale of the manure collected, and from 
fees of 1 or 2 cash paid by those using them, according as paper and 
cigarette are furnished or not.
Chadwick noted that manure was removed daily from the latrines, 
as it was from private houses. He also went into the question of cost of 
nightsoil removal. Nevertheless, he settled in favor of the construction 
of house drains, arguing that the dry earth system solved only partly 
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the problem of waste disposal. On the question of hygiene in Chinese 
houses, a report had been made in 1874 by the Colonial Surgeon. It 
outlined a sorry state of affairs that had to do with pigs, ventilation, 
drainage, and the lack of toilets. The Colonial Surgeon discovered ‘that 
pigs were kept in houses all over the town, by hundreds, and that pigsties 
were to be found under the beds and in the kitchens of first, second, and 
third floors. … Ventilation was poor. Houses were either constructed 
back to back with no ventilation except from the front, or were separated 
only by a narrow and often clogged gully in between two houses. … 
The average size of the main rooms is 26 feet by 14 feet by 10 feet high, 
containing eight partitions, averaging 7 feet by 6 feet by 7 feet high, over 
which a sort of loft is often built to increase the accommodation, and in 
a room of this description, from 16 to 25 people live. The houses were 
also dirty, for the brick walls were not whitewashed, wide interstices 
appeared between wooden planks that made up the upper floors, and 
the ground floor was made of mud. This construction made washing the 
floor impossible. These long, dark, poorly ventilated and dirty houses 
had no toilets. The men went to public toilets and the women and 
children used chamber pots kept under their beds.’32
3. Reform of the Tung Wah Hospital
As compared with the other hospitals including The Medical Missionary 
Hospital (1843-53), Seamen’s Hospital (1843-73), Government Civil 
Hospital (1849-1937), and Lock Hospital (1858-94), Tung Wah Hospital 
was the first Chinese hospital for the cure and treatment of the indigent 
sick to be supported by voluntary contributions.33 The idea of setting up a 
32¡ David Faure, “The common people in Hong Kong history: their livelihood and aspirations until 
the 1930s,” in Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration, ed. Lee 
Pui-Tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 10-19.
33¡ Chinese Hospital Ordinance No. 3 of 1870. See Lau Yun-woo, “Managed by Chinese, for 
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Chinese hospital was supported by the governor Sir Richard MacDonnell 
in 1869. The idea originated from the upgrading of the Kwong Fook 
I-Tsz (廣福義祠), a dilapidated receiving house for the dead. The hospital 
was opened on February 14, 1872. It had 80-100 beds, and was located 
very close to the I-Tsz. 
Current studies on Tung Wah Hospital mostly praise this first 
Chinese voluntary organization which provided medical and charitable 
services to the Chinese community and emphasized the specified role 
played by the local Chinese elites in managing this organization. One 
may hold reservations on this observation, though. First, the 
establishment of Tung Wah Hospital proved that Hong Kong’s society 
was hierarchically divided into two different sectors, one for Europeans 
and one for Chinese. Europeans lived within their own separate area, and 
the area was clearly demarcated from that of the local Chinese 
community. Second, as Chinese strongly resisted western medicine and 
sanitary standards, they preferred to live in a closed community, 
embodied by the Tung Wah Committee, that was supposed to care for all 
the needs of the community members. By doing so they would be able to 
resist intervention from the government.34
After the outbreak of the plague, Tung Wah had been criticized for 
its incompetence in dealing with the crisis. The Chinese patients, whom 
Tung Wah received, had to be transferred to the Government Civil 
Hospital.35 According to the review report conducted by the government, 
Tung Wah was blamed for: 1) being overcrowded, filthy, insanitary, and 
dangerous not only to the health of the inmates but to the public of Hong 
Chinese: the founding of Tung Wah Hospital,” in A Sense of Place: Hong Kong West of Pottinger 
Street, eds. Veronica Pearson and Ko Tim-keung, 239.
34¡ Hong Zhou, The Origins of Government Social Protection Policy in Hong Kong, 1842-1941, 
134-135.
35¡ A History of Medicine in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Academy of Medicine Press, 
2011), 27-28.
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Kong; 2) being a not well conducted hospital for the relief and the cure 
of sick and destitute Chinese; and 3) being without effective 
administration to provide medical treatment to the sick.36 The Acting 
Superintendent of the Government Civil Hospital, Dr. James Lowson 
commented on Tung Wah:
The question of dealing with the Tung Wa Hospital must now be 
seriously considered. I cannot denounce this hot-bed of medical and 
sanitary vice in sufficiently strong terms. I venture to say that if the 
question of allowing this to remain was to be submitted to the Public 
Health Authorities at home they would order its immediate abolition. …37
As a consequence, a special commission was appointed by the Governor 
to conduct an investigation of Tung Wah Hospital. The commission 
called references from India and Singapore of the management of 
Chinese hospitals in these two other British colonies. They found out that 
even the Brahmins in India accepted more western medicine than the 
Chinese in Hong Kong. And in Singapore, there was no Chinese hospital. 
The Tan Tock Seng’s Hospital was in the European model, indicating all 
Chinese in Singapore were treated under western medicine.38 As shown 
in Table 4, the listed Chinese doctors were all blamed for incompetence 
in curing their Chinese patients.
36¡ Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T. H. Whitehead, in Hong Kong Legislative Council Sessional 
Papers 1896, xxi.
37¡ Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T. H. Whitehead, in Hong Kong Legislative Council Sessional 
Papers 1896, xxiii.
38¡ Correspondence from Colonial Secretary of Singapore J. A. Swettenham to the Colonial 
Secretary of Hong Kong J. H. Stewart Lockhart, dated September 17, 1895. Report on Tung Wa 
Hospital by T. H. Whitehead, in Hong Kong Legislative Council Sessional Papers 1896, lxvi-
lxvii.
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Table 4. Chinese Practitioners of Medicine at Tung Wah Hospital
Names Position Date of entry Monthly salary
Lam Hok-nin Doctor 
(Internal complaints)
July 26, 1886 20 taels*
Lam Tsz-ching Doctor 
(External complaints)
March 2, 1889 20 taels
Lam Fuk-bim Doctor (Injuries) September 3, 1891 20 taels
Tong Sui-ting Doctor (Internal complaints)
November 8, 1893 20 taels
Wong Siu-ki Doctor (Internal complaints)
February 16, 1895 20 taels
Wai Sz-chi Doctor (Internal complaints)
April 24, 1896 20 taels
Yeung Tsui-ngai Doctor (Internal complaints)
May 13, 1896 20 taels
Wan Leung-kung Doctor (Internal complaints)
May 20, 1896 20 taels
*1 tael = 1.39 dollars
Source: Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T.H. Whitehead, in Hong Kong Legislative Council 
Sessional Papers 1896, lxxiv.
It was not until December 1896 that the first Chinese practitioner of 
western medicine, Chung Boon-chor (鍾本初) was appointed. Chung was 
graduated from the Government Central School and then received 
western medical education in Tientsin Medical College. He returned to 
Hong Kong and joined the Nethersole Hospital as an honorary surgeon.39
The Tung Wah Hospital had once been put under threat of being 
abolished but it cannot be said that the government met with no 
opposition. Actually, the Hospital tried to stop the government 
intervention. On November 6, 1895, the hospital’s committee asked a 
solicitor, Victor H. Deacon, to send a warning letter to the Acting 
39¡ Healing with the Scalpel: From the First Colonial Surgeon to the College of Surgeons of Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Academy of Medicine Press, 2010), 23-24.
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Colonial Surgeon J. M. Atkinson. That letter reads,
I am instructed by the Directors of the Tung Wa Hospital to request 
you to take no steps towards the removal of Chan Kam Shing from the 
Hospital on the ground that the patient is unwilling to go and elects to 
remain in the Tung Wa Hospital. …The Directors inform me that you 
have called to-day at the Hospital in order to remove him; but under the 
Hospital Ordinance I would remind you that the only power given to the 
Colonial Surgeon is to inspect the Hospital – clause 14 – and that the 
Board of Directors has full power to manage and direct Hospital matters 
– clause 8. If therefore any compulsory removal is contemplated it will 
be illegal.40
The confrontation was not eased until the Tung Wah Hospital took 
several measures. First, a year later, the Chinese surgeon of Western 
medicine, Chung Boon-chor, was appointed, as mentioned above. 
Second, new wards were built so as to separate the contagious patients 
and the ordinary patients. As a result, more Chinese patients opted for 
western medical treatment than ever before. By then, Tung Wah was 
transformed into both a Chinese and a Western hospital.
V. Conclusion
In many aspects, the Hong Kong plague of 1894 can be viewed in a 
global context. First, while Hong Kong had the merit of being close to 
mainland China and enjoyed a good economic relationship with the 
hinterlands, its proximity and close ties to mainland China made it 
vulnerable to diseases and plague. Second, comparatively, Indians 
40¡ Correspondence from Victor H. Deacon to the Colonial Surgeon J.M. Atkinson, dated November 
6, 1895. Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T. H. Whitehead, in Hong Kong Legislative Council 
Sessional Papers 1896, lii.
 123 
believed more in Western medicine than did the Chinese, and Chinese in 
Singapore did not ask for a Chinese hospital whereas Hong Kong had to 
struggle for one. Third, in its outposts in Asia including Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and India, Great Britain had been successfully 
implementing public health policies.
As Hong Kong had close economic ties with mainland China as 
well as trade relationships with its counterpart cities in Asia, flows of 
capital, people, merchandises, and information in the Asian Pacific 
region were easily coming into existence. Basically, the framework of the 
British Empire in Asia was designed for extending networks so as to 
promote trade among China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India. 
Nevertheless, this also facilitated the spread of epidemic diseases such as 
plague and malaria.
It is not easy to define the term “colonialism” or “nationalism,” but 
it is quite obvious that the rivalry among Aoyama Tanemichi, Kitasato 
Shibasaburō, and Alexandre Yersin was mainly due to the fact that they 
belonged to different races, classes, and academic cliques. Colonial 
bureaucracy also accelerated the competition in public health. These 
medical practitioners did not receive equal treatment from the Hong 
Kong colonial government when they first came to Hong Kong to 
conduct investigations. Aoyama, Kitasato, and Yersin received similar 
educations from Robert Koch, but they never cooperated with each other. 
Instead, individuals stood in rivalry against other individuals and 
institutions, and this resulted in hindering the growth of scientific 
development.41 Certainly, both Kitasato and Yersin had identified the 
plague bacillus, but several years later when India suffered from the 
41¡ The Japanese scholar Kani Hiroaki argued that the contribution made by Kitasato can hardly be 
retrieved from the Hong Kong history writings because of 1894-95; and second, main reasons: 
first, the feeling of hatred toward Japan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95; and second, 
the general dislike of Western medicine. See his “Kitasato Shibasaburō no Honkon” [Kitasato 
Shibasaburō’s Hong Kong], Mita hyōron, no. 739 (1973:6), 89-90.
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epidemic from 1906 to 1908, the Indian Plague Investigation Committee 
discovered that the flea functioned as an intermediary between a dead rat 
and a human. Hence, the Indian case shows that scientific invention 
should be above race or nationality.
During the late nineteenth century, Chinese were regarded by 
Europeans as a sanitary nuisance. Thus, there was a gap between the 
concepts of sanitariness and medicine. In order to protect Chinese, they 
themselves fought for the Tung Wah Hospital, which was the first 
Chinese hospital in Hong Kong. However, about twenty years after it 
opened, the colonial government threatened to close it, and a 
confrontation arose between the government officials and the Chinese 
elites. In this sense, modern medicine was implemented through political 
force. Together with house-to-house disinfection, containment in the 
Hygeia, and the demolition of the Tai Ping Shan area, this aroused great 
protest from the local Chinese community. It is worth noting here that 
from the case of Tung Wah Hospital, it looked impossible, but actually 
Chinese had learned how to retreat from resistance and move forward to 
acceptance of western medicine. The appointment of Chung Boon-chor 
was regarded as a compromise between the colonial government and the 
Chinese elites. Chung had successfully removed all suspicion from both 
the British colonists and the general Chinese populace. He had showed 
how western medicine can be mixed with Chinese medicine and cured 
many of the Chinese patients. There were ways to find a common ground 
between “nationalism” and “colonialism” when confronting a bubonic 
plague crisis.
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